The most telling sign is the recent “no-show” of Russian President Vladimir Putin in Turkey, where a new negotiation format was supposed to be formed. Instead, Russia sent a low-profile delegation without senior political heavyweights — which in diplomatic language clearly signals: Moscow does not intend to participate in serious negotiations at this time.

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This is no coincidence. Putin remains convinced that the war will bring him more in the long term than a “here and now” peace agreement — especially one that would partly respect Ukrainian positions and the principles of its Western allies (primarily regarding the preservation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and security guarantees for Kyiv). In his view, a ceasefire now would mean admitting failure, so instead he chooses to delay and continue military destruction.

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The delegation Russia sent therefore has a very clear task: to buy time and create the impression that Russia is negotiating. In reality, it is a tactical manoeuvre by which Putin wants to show there is an alternative to the Western approach — primarily the one advocated by the U.S. and the biggest European countries — that is, the idea of unconditional ceasefire as a prerequisite for negotiations. This Russian “offer” or Kremlin approach has recently gained endorsement from Trump (not least during the phone call between the two presidents on May 19), effectively forcing Ukraine to engage in this diplomatic theatre. Knowing well that the Kremlin has once again tactically outplayed the White House and that nothing will come of these “talks for talks’ sake,” Kyiv has no other option but to do everything while creating the impression it participates constructively, follows Trump’s wishes, and certainly does not “sabotage” peace talks. Which, of course, they are not.

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Moscow in its negotiating ambitions refers to the failed talks from spring 2022 — as if time had stood still since then. Thus, Russia’s positions remain unchanged: Ukrainian capitulation, no security guarantees, limitations on the size of the army and armaments, and thus de facto political subordination to Moscow. The current delegation’s composition is almost identical to the one from two years ago, which clearly shows there is no change in Russia’s thinking. More than that: I would risk the assessment that Moscow — aware of the “American carrot” — will insist not only on the same positions as in spring ’22 but will escalate these demands during talks, asking for more and more. Not just the four Ukrainian regions that Moscow still does not fully control militarily, but why not also Kharkiv and its surroundings. Or the Sumy region, which is not in Russia’s strategic interests, but where military attacks and civilian killings have been carried out in recent months.

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As long as Trump offers Moscow only a carrot and Kyiv only a stick, Putin has no serious political or economic reason to make any concessions in readiness to negotiate. And as long as this is the case, he will live with the conviction that any peace today would bring him “less” than what he could achieve with military objectives in 6, 12, or 24 months.

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Therefore, the current “negotiations” are more of a smokescreen than a sincere attempt to approach peace. Putin is not seeking compromise — he is seeking Russia’s victory on terms at least as demanding as in spring 2022, and which could escalate month by month. Meanwhile, European countries are still stuck in place and apart from announcing new sanction packages, they cannot find any serious alternative to Trump’s transactional approach. For now, everything indicates that time is playing in favour of the Kremlin.

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As long as Trump offers Moscow only a carrot and Kyiv only a stick, Putin has no serious political or economic reason to make any concessions in readiness to negotiate. And as long as this is the case, he will live with the conviction that any peace today would bring him “less” than what he could achieve with military objectives in 6, 12, or 24 months.

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