Author
dr. Denis Mancevič
The new strategy is important primarily because, in written form, it confirms structural changes and a trend that has been present in transatlantic relations for some time: the U.S. is withdrawing politically and strategically from Europe, and Europe will have to assume responsibility for its own security, resilience, and international positioning as a sovereign global actor much faster. Put plainly, the document is a final alarm for Europe that, going forward, it must rely on itself strategically.
If we read the strategy without sugarcoating, the message is clear: Washington no longer treats Europe—above all the European Union—as a natural partner, but as an entity that obstructs U.S. interests. Not necessarily in the classic security sense, but primarily in the geo-economic one. The EU is portrayed in the document as a supranational structure that is supposedly “hostile” and too great a threat to U.S. economic interests and to the freedom of American companies to operate.
One of the most telling elements is the accusation that the EU or European states should “open their markets.” This is above all a political argument: European markets are not closed— they are regulated. EU member states operate under common rules of the game—from competition and state aid to digital markets, privacy, and consumer protection—and these rules apply to all companies, regardless of their country of origin.
That is the core of the conflict. A part of current U.S. politics, together with influential actors in the tech sector, wants an environment where business conditions are more aligned with U.S. interests and business models. European regulation limits that logic, which is why the EU is framed as an obstacle that needs to be dismantled to “liberate nation-states.”
The strategy does not target only the economy. In the section dealing with the EU (and it is unquestionably central to the document), there is a distinct political-ideological framing: Europe is accused of stifling free speech and obstructing political opposition, while migration and low birth rates are said to lead to “civilizational extinction.” This rhetoric is no accident. It represents an attempt to delegitimize the European project and implicitly support a more fragmented Europe that would operate in a MAGA-style manner—more national, more divided, and consequently more manageable through bilateral deals.
In this part, one can also detect a broader ambition: a weaker EU means more room for external actors who have no interest in European unity. When the EU is portrayed as the problem rather than the solution, this is effectively a signal that dismantling European cohesion is a legitimate political objective.
A week before this document was released, I attended an international conference in Vienna organized by the ERSTE Foundation, where Francis Fukuyama also spoke. On Trump’s approach to Ukraine—the pressure for surrender or capitulation and the de facto internalization of Kremlin interests and arguments—he said that, in his view, this constitutes “the greatest moral betrayal by the United States in his lifetime.”
To this one could easily add: if Ukraine is the first and most obvious victim of this approach, with this new strategy the list of those betrayed by the U.S. has now expanded dramatically—to the entire EU. Not necessarily in the sense of an immediate break in the alliance, but in the sense of abandoning the core assumption that European stability and European integration are U.S. strategic interests. The document signals precisely the opposite: the EU is increasingly viewed as a (hostile) competitor.
Interest Calculus Regarding Russia, the new U.S. strategy outlines a fairly simple, pragmatic framework: Russia is not presented as an ally, but neither as an essential primary enemy. The emphasis is on “strategic balance,” which may imply reduced direct confrontation and more room for deals. The problem for Europe is that such a framework reduces the predictability of U.S. security commitments and increases the pressure on the EU to shape its own deterrence, its support for Ukraine, and its long-term Russia policy. At the forefront are economic interests—not those of the U.S. as a whole, but of individuals within or close to the administration who anticipate billions in profits from lifting sanctions and gaining privileged access to the Russian market.
Europe is poorly prepared for this turning point. There is no more room for procrastination. The key response is to accelerate integration and to engage in a serious discussion about how to reform the EU so it can respond more quickly and independently—not only because of the U.S. withdrawal but also due to the wider competition in military and geo-economic terms.
There is little in the new strategy that is entirely new; we have heard most of these messages over the past year from members of the U.S. administration, and none of it should surprise us anymore. The difference is that now everything is written down—black and white. And once transatlantic shifts are codified into an official strategy, they cease to be merely political rhetoric or tactical positioning; they become the political framework.